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I wonder if they could have tried opposing engines?
I was shocked at how quickly it went from "it's not doing what I want" to "grinding and vibration heard on bridge microphones"

All because they didn't identify the steering system was in autopilot, should be first check but I'm not up to speed with Azipod steering controls and IAs.

Let alone the fact the deployed the vessel with CO, XO, OOW and possibly Navigator all unqualified/trained for that particular vessel.

Mind blowing

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D3 said..

All because they didn't identify the steering system was in autopilot, should be first check

Don't disagree. Worth noting if you read the report linked in the other thread on preventers, this is not a unique problem.

Whilst I'm only using the wheel-pilot because I can't afford a very expensive under-deck hydraulic ram system I like the fact that the disengage lever is manual and obvious.

For those with an under-deck hydraulic ram and electronic clutch, probably integrated to a chart-plotter, how would you know your pilot is disengaged in an emergency at a single glance?

because the autopilot read out says 'standby' NOT 'auto'

it's fairly simple...but aparently not simple enough for kiwis

cheers,

The whole thing is a worry. It seems like the lot of the crew failed to recognise that the autopilot was on and just kept on adding thrust till she was doing 10 knots into the reef. 174 million gone because the guys driving didn't know about the autopilot being on when they wound up the throttles. Sad.

If I am manoeuvering close to objects, including the shore, I am not engaging the autopilot. I wonder why it was engaged in the first place - was it deliberate or by mistake? If it was by mistake, that would go someway to why the helmsman didn't realise it was on. If it was deliberate, then how could they not know it was on, or was it engaged by someone other then the helmsman, who didn't communicate their action to the helmsman - neither when they did it, nor subsequently? For me, any of these possibilities reinforces possible lack of training and standard procedures for helming (or if procedures where specified, whether they were followed).

Based on the report, the ship wasn't on autopilot at 18:11:13, when turned to a course of 340 degrees (heading towards shore and ultimately the collision point), but was on autopilot just under 2 minutes later at 18:13:08. No mention of who engaged autopilot and how this was communicated on bridge (if at all).

It's only a minute and a half later (18:14:47) that an attempt to turn right fails. 33 seconds later (18:15:20) the ECDIS alarm goes off (indicating ship is approaching closer than set alarm radius to a hazard), and then escalating attempts are made over the next less than 2 minutes to turn the ship (by increasing angle of steering controls (azipods) and increasing throttles to 100% (18:17:00) including attempting full astern) which actually make matters worse because increased thrust intended to increase turning and then to cause a stop, only increases the speed of the ship on the set course. Commanding officer called to bridge (18:16:55) and arrives 25 seconds after being called (18:17:20), and 38 seconds before grounding (18:17:59 "grinding and shaking" heard on recording).

The events also illustrates how fear/panic can rapidly narrow people's focus and actions, such that they don't step back to ask themselves more broadly, what is happening here? - rather they respond directly to the immediate - ship not turning, so try harder to turn the ship. In my view this is generally worse when people have less experience and insufficient training.

I find it strange that the autopilot station is separate to the helming station on the bridge (which appears to be the case). I wonder, given this bridge layout, if there had been another officer at the autopilot station, whether they would have spotted the problem. Which also raises the question of how the autopilot being engaged is displayed (or not) to the helmsman - is a big light, or a clear (and constantly displayed while autopilot is on) message on the display(s) in front of the helmsman? If not, why not? This goes to the adequacy of the layout and of displayed information on the bridge.

When I look at the recs in the report, I cannot see where it is identified as to when and who activated the autopilot. Nor can I see anything about how autopilot status is displayed to the helmsman. Nor is there commentary about whether minimum personnel on the bridge is meant to be more than two during close to shore manoeuvres, and includes someone monitoring the autopilot as part of standard procedures of which the crew was not aware.